Custom agents
Note
Guide: draft. The Unix local API and Rust client exist in source. Windows transport, attested agent identity, and independent validation remain open.
Enforcement level
L2 Mediated. The agent asks Shiin for decisions through the local API.
Interception
A custom agent built with shiin-client calls the local API over a Unix domain socket.
The API uses JSON-RPC 2.0. The client returns an error for an unavailable daemon or malformed response; the caller must stop the action unless Shiin returns allow.
#![allow(unused)]
fn main() {
use shiin_client::Client;
use shiin_schema::DecisionValue;
let client = Client::from_environment()?;
let decision = client.evaluate(&request).await?;
if decision.decision != DecisionValue::Allow {
return Err("Shiin did not allow the action".into());
}
}What it cannot see
The client/service integration tests exercise real Unix RPCs for policy validation, allow/deny/pending, unattended mode, stale snapshots, operator proof, single-use and scoped grants, revocation, and built-in denial precedence. They verify grant transition events and that operator credentials do not enter the audit log. This source conformance coverage does not establish interception or identity binding in an external agent.
- Agent identity assurance: the daemon authenticates the local Unix user but does not yet bind that identity to the request’s agent id.
- Windows named-pipe transport.